The Narrow Sea: Shipping, Islands and Great-Power Rivalry in the Mozambique Channel

Look at a map of world shipping and one lane runs past Mozambique's front door. Tankers from the Gulf heading to the Atlantic, bulk carriers from Brazil heading to China, and, since 2023, container ships fleeing the Red Sea all funnel through or past the Mozambique Channel, the stretch of the Indian Ocean between Mozambique and Madagascar.

Three rivalries meet in this narrow sea: a colonial-era dispute over French-held islands, a contest for influence between India, China and the West, and the struggle of fragile coastal states to police waters rich in gas, fish and trafficking routes. This article maps them.

Since attacks on shipping in the Red Sea began in late 2023, carriers have repeatedly abandoned the Suez route for the long way round Africa, adding roughly two weeks to Asia–Europe voyages. Traffic around southern Africa stayed elevated through 2025 and surged again in April 2026, when renewed Middle East escalation drove tanker movements around the Cape to their highest levels since early 2025.

For Mozambique, more passing ships are mostly a missed opportunity. Durban, Port Louis and Walvis Bay capture most bunkering, ship supply and crew changes. Maputo, Beira and Nacala could compete for a share of that business — fuel, provisions, repairs and crew transfers — if they offered the services and the paperwork speed that shipping lines demand.

Scattered around Madagascar are five French-held islands and atolls — Europa, the Glorieuses, Juan de Nova, Tromelin and Bassas da India — with a combined land area of under 40 km². Around them France claims exclusive economic zones of about 640,000 km², and more than a million square kilometres together with Mayotte and Réunion.

Madagascar has claimed most of the islands since 1972, and a non-binding 1979 UN General Assembly resolution called for their return. The Comoros claims the Glorieuses; Mauritius claims Tromelin. In 2025 France and Madagascar reopened talks, with President Macron reportedly favouring joint management over transfer of sovereignty. Political upheaval in Madagascar — the military took power in October 2025 after mass youth protests — adds uncertainty to any settlement.

At stake is not the land, which is tiny, but the seabed and fish around it — in a basin where giant gas fields have already been found.

France is the resident power, with Mayotte, Réunion and the Scattered Islands, military garrisons and the largest maritime footprint. India is the most active newcomer: it has given Mozambique six fast interceptor craft since 2019 for counter-terrorism and anti-piracy work, trains its navy, links Madagascar's maritime information centre with its own Information Fusion Centre, and built an airstrip and jetty on Mauritius's Agaléga island. Its companies own 30% of Mozambique's Area 1 gas. China has CNPC in Area 4, an embassy and lending in the Comoros, and a growing commercial presence across all three coastal states. The United States is present through ExxonMobil and security assistance.

• Piracy. Somali-linked piracy reached the channel around 2010, including the hijacking of an Indian merchant vessel. Analysts warn of a revival as naval attention shifts to the Red Sea.
• Insurgency on the coast. Insurgents in Cabo Delgado seized the port of Mocímboa da Praia and attacked Palma in 2021, and have used boats along the coast and to nearby islands.
• Trafficking. The channel is a long-standing route for illicit goods, including narcotics, moving by dhow and container towards southern Africa and beyond.
• Illegal fishing. Weak surveillance across vast exclusive economic zones invites foreign fleets.
• Environmental risk. The 2020 grounding of the MV Wakashio off Mauritius spilled about 1,000 tonnes of oil — a warning for a channel that will soon carry far more LNG and crude.

The channel's traffic will only grow as Mozambique's LNG comes on stream and Red Sea risks persist. The opportunities are practical: bunkering and ship supply at Maputo and Nacala, maritime surveillance and coast-guard services, offshore logistics for gas projects, fisheries management with neighbours, and regional cooperation with Madagascar, the Comoros and France on search and rescue and oil-spill response.