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Wired Together: Power, Gas, Labour and the South Africa–Mozambique Economy

Electricity flows south from Cahora Bassa, gas flows south through a 865km pipeline, and miners and minerals cross at Ressano Garcia. In 2026 the shutdown of the Mozal smelter showed how tightly the two economies are bound — and how fragile the bonds are.

October 11, 2026Economic Intelligence · Region Desk6 min read
At a glance
$2.1bn
Imports from South Africa
25% of the total, 2024
66%
HCB power sold to Eskom
8,319 GWh in 2024
24,000
Mozal jobs at stake
Direct and indirect
70,000
SA jobs tied to Mozambican gas
At risk from the gas cliff (SA government)
~17,000
Mozambican mineworkers in SA
TEBA, 2022
In brief

The neighbour that matters most

For all the talk of India, China and the Gulf, Mozambique's most important economic relationship is still with the country next door. South Africa sells Mozambique a quarter of everything it imports, buys its electricity and gas, employs its miners, sends its tourists and ships its minerals through Maputo.

25%of Mozambique's imports come from South Africa — $2.1bn in 2024
66%of Cahora Bassa's electricity was sold to Eskom in 2024
940 MWpower demand of the Mozal smelter, idled in March 2026
~17,000Mozambicans working in South African mines

This interdependence is a strength when it works and a shared vulnerability when it does not. The past two years tested it repeatedly: post-election protests closed the main border, drought hit Cahora Bassa, South Africa's gas supply from Mozambique began running down, and a failed power negotiation shut Mozambique's biggest factory.

01 · Trade

A lopsided but essential trade

In 2024, according to Bank of Mozambique data, South Africa supplied $2.09bn of Mozambique's imports — electricity, cars, steel bars, flour, and much of what fills Maputo's supermarket shelves. Mozambique sold South Africa $1.21bn, mostly natural gas, electricity, coal and bananas, making it the third-largest destination for Mozambican exports after India and China.

The imbalance reflects South Africa's manufacturing base and its retailers' reach into southern Mozambique. But the flows also run through Mozambique: the Port of Maputo handles about half of South Africa's chrome exports, earning transit revenue that does not appear in bilateral trade figures at all.

Exhibit 1
Mozambique's trade with its main partners, 2024, $ million

South Africa is by far the largest supplier and the third-largest export market. Singapore import value not reported in the source.

Source: Banco de Moçambique, via Lusa / Club of Mozambique (Jun 2025).

02 · Electricity

Cahora Bassa: Mozambique's power, South Africa's customer

The roughly 2,075 MW Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi — built in the colonial era largely to supply South Africa — still sends most of its output south. In 2024 its operator, HCB, delivered 12,351 GWh: 8,319 GWh to Eskom (66%), 3,451 GWh to Mozambique's utility EDM (28%) and 499 GWh to Zimbabwe's ZESA (4%).

The flow also runs back. Mozal, the aluminium smelter outside Maputo, needs about 940 MW of continuous power, and Eskom supplied roughly 90% of it through a long-standing arrangement linked to Cahora Bassa. When that contract expired at the end of March 2026 and no affordable replacement was agreed, South32 placed Mozal on care and maintenance.

Mozambique's largest factory closed not for lack of electricity in Mozambique, but for lack of a price both neighbours could accept.

The cost is large. Mozal produced 355,000 tonnes of aluminium in the year to June 2025, supported about 4,000 direct and 20,000 indirect jobs, and accounted for a big share of Mozambique's export earnings.

Exhibit 2
Who buys Cahora Bassa's electricity? Energy delivered in 2024, GWh

Total 12,351 GWh. Transmission losses were 6.76% of production.

Source: HCB report and accounts, via Lusa / Club of Mozambique (Jul 2025).

Exhibit 3
Mozal: what was switched off in March 2026
OwnerSouth32 (63.7%) with partners
Output, year to June 2025355,000 tonnes of aluminium (+13%)
Continuous power demandAbout 940 MW
Share supplied by EskomAbout 90%
Jobs~4,000 direct; ~20,000 indirect
StatusCare and maintenance from March 2026
Care and maintenance cost~$60m one-off; ~$5m a year

Source: Engineering News (Feb 2026); AJ Bell / Reuters (Mar 2026); Club of Mozambique (Jan 2026).

03 · Gas

The pipeline and the gas cliff

Since 2004, gas from Sasol's Pande and Temane fields in Inhambane province has flowed through the ROMPCO pipeline to Secunda in South Africa, feeding Sasol's synthetic-fuels plant and industrial users across Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. South African officials say the supply supports more than 13,000 direct jobs and around 5% of South Africa's GDP.

The fields are running down. Output is expected to drop sharply by 2028, and Sasol has indicated supply only until about 2030. South Africa warns that up to 70,000 jobs are at risk. In 2026 the two governments agreed to pursue an LNG import terminal to keep gas flowing through ROMPCO and to discuss extending the pipeline's concession — potentially at Matola, where a 4.9 mtpa LNG jetty is planned.

The irony is sharp: Mozambique is about to become one of the world's largest LNG exporters from the north, while the south of the country — and its neighbour — may have to import LNG.

Exhibit 4
The ties that bind: power lines, gas pipeline and the Maputo corridor
Electricity
Gas
Border and port

Alignments are schematic.

Source: Economic Intelligence. Basemap © Esri, © OpenStreetMap contributors.

04 · People

Miners, migrants and the border

Mozambicans have worked in South African mines for well over a century, recruited through agencies such as TEBA. About 17,000 still did in 2022, and more than 15,000 crossed home through Ressano Garcia for the December holidays. Many more work on South African farms, construction sites and in the informal economy. In 2026, more than 1,200 former mineworkers were identified to receive about R148m in unclaimed benefits.

The Lebombo–Ressano Garcia crossing is the busiest on the corridor and a recurring bottleneck: truck queues stretch for kilometres when systems fail on either side, and the post-election protests of late 2024 closed it repeatedly — disrupting fuel, food and mineral flows in both directions.

Exhibit 5
What each neighbour needs from the other
Cahora Bassa electricityHard-currency revenue for HCBTwo-thirds of HCB output for EskomMedium
Pande–Temane gas via ROMPCORoyalties, Sasol investmentGas for Secunda and industryHigh
Mozal power arrangementLargest factory, 24,000 jobsLarge, steady Eskom customerHigh
Maputo port transitPort revenue, rail trafficOutlet for chrome, coal and magnetiteLow
Migrant labourWages, remittances, pensionsExperienced mine labourLow
Consumer goods and retailSupply for shops and supermarkets$2.1bn export marketMedium

Editorial assessment of current risk to each link.

Source: Economic Intelligence analysis.

05 · Outlook

From dependence to partnership

  • Price power regionally. The Mozal failure shows that bilateral power deals need regional pricing through the Southern African Power Pool, not one-off negotiations.
  • Solve the gas cliff together. An LNG terminal at Matola feeding ROMPCO would serve both countries — and could later carry gas from Mozambique's own northern fields.
  • Fix the border. A one-stop, 24-hour border post and more rail capacity on the Ressano Garcia line would cut costs for miners, retailers and the port alike.
  • Restart Mozal. A credible long-term power solution would bring back Mozambique's largest manufacturing employer.

Sources

This report draws on 9 cited sources. View them in Sources cited in every report →